This book is not a comparative exercise per se. The guidelines presented in the Introduction were shared and discussed with all of the contributors; however, ultimately, each of them was free to put the emphasis on certain aspects of the theoretical framework so as to best reflect the specificities of their respective cases. Not all of the points mentioned (e.g. compliance with the Paris Declaration, the role of ideas, etc.) are relevant to all the South-South cooperation (SSC) providers covered in the book. The editors were anxious to let authors focus on what is most relevant in the case at hand and to let research questions emerge from observations of the cases and fieldwork rather than from a common list of imposed probléma-tiques defined ex ante.
This flexible and adaptable methodology helped create room for the diversity of contemporary SSC experiences that are observable in the world. Therefore, the focus on the role of religion and Islamic associations in the case studies about Turkey and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) (Chaps. 2 and 8, respectively), the importance of the private sector in the chapters dealing with India (Chap. 1) and Brazil (Chap. 4) , and the salience of security objectives and triangular cooperation in the one that explores Colombian SSC (Chap. 9).
In addition to individual contributions, the authors answered a couple of additional questions related to decision making in SSC, factors and actors shaping its practice, and issues related to the identities and positioning of SSC providers. The diverse aspects covered in this book were common to all authors, thus enabling the final images to be presented through a comparative lens in this Conclusion, including aspects that were not necessarily mentioned in the various chapters.
The information provided was gathered into graphs, tables, and typologies, which come with appropriate descriptions and analyses. They are structured along several analytical axes: (1) the status and profile of the donor in the field of development assistance is the first. The two sections that follow cover: (2) the factors and actors that sustain and shape SCC by looking at ideas, ideologies, and identities, and (3) the presidentialization versus professionalization of SSC. Then comes (4) the role of the private sector and civil society in shaping and implementing SSC. The next axis, (5) , explores the links between SSC and foreign policy objectives, and (6) discusses the differences and interactions of SSC with existing norms and traditional donors. Here the intention is to lay out and interpret the diversity of SSC experiences rather than to explain them in a causal, positivist sense.
StatuS and Profile in the field of international develoPment aSSiStance aid. While some focus on knowledge transfer (Colombia), others invest in infrastructure (China). The modalities of aid delivery methods differ as well as the sectors of intervention and regional areas of attention-that is, health for Cuba, agriculture and health for Brazil, and security for Colombia. The objective of this section is to present the diversity of SSC experiences by focusing on how its providers are positioned (i.e. structural and material factors) and position themselves (i.e. self-perceptions and perceptions by others) in the field of international development assistance. It combines the following three attributes:
(1) Novelty in the field: Is the country new in the practice of development assistance, and/or what is new about it? (2) Being an aid-recipient or not: Their positions and constraints as SSC providers. (3) Elements of self-presentation and perception in the field through references to the traditional categories of "donor," "aid," and "SSC." Here it is necessary to understand whether the countries under study identify as "donors" providing "aid" and are committed to "South-South cooperation."
This comparative analysis points to the fact that despite the enthusiasm associated with contemporary SSC, most Southern donors actually are not "new" to the field of development assistance. South Africa has been a modest donor since before the formalization of apartheid (1948), China has been providing cooperation since the 1950s, Cuba and India since the 1960s, and the UAE and Colombia since the 1970s. A government programme for students from Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean to study in Brazil dates back to 1965 (Programa de Estudante Convenio Graduaçao, PEC-G). It was largely inspired by efforts to engage with what was then the Third World during the time of Brazil's Independent Foreign Policy (1961) (1962) (1963) (1964) . 1 Only the Republic of Korea and Turkey have started to provide assistance to other developing countries relatively recently, in the 1990s.
Often, such programmes have gained in importance and visibility during the 2000s (e.g. Brazil, Venezuela), as Southern donors found new interests in SSC, as the rise in the price of commodities gave them additional room to manoeuver, and as traditional aid volumes decreased. The increase in SSC has been linked to economic development in most cases, but also political change, particularly democratic transition. South Africa has provided aid since the establishment of the apartheid regime but in a very limited way, and the money was used to win legitimacy. After 1994, it was more about being a legitimate development actor and about strengthening development diplomacy. In this context, what matters for current and future research is to explore the evolution of SSC (i.e. meaning, practices, and effects) throughout time and the differences between past and present.
Cuba, Turkey, Brazil, India, China, and Colombia are still aid recipients, even if the volume of the aid they receive is structurally decreasing as these countries become classified as "emerging" economies or "middleincome countries" (MICs). 2 This means that they are in the situation of being both donors and recipients at the same time, a situation that creates specific opportunities and constraints. These do not affect and are not handled in the same manner by the governments. Here three profiles can be distinguished and are described in the following subsections.
Emerging Economies
Some emerging economies continue to receive aid. This aid often is justified more by political and economic factors because Northern countries use aid as a tool to enhance investments, the establishment of businesses, and trade with those economies with high potential. High levels of inequality and gaps in socioeconomic development between various regions of emerging countries also justify that aid still be given. The share of aid in the national GDP is marginal and virtually can be neglected. As a result, duality does not affect the way emerging donors define themselves and behave in the field of international development assistance; at the same time, they can receive external funds and, as SSC providers, be critical of traditional aid and donors, including by referring to their experience as aid-recipients.
MICs in a Dual Situation
Here reference is made to Turkey and Colombia. The dual situation affects these SSC providers more than the emerging economies. For instance, in Colombia, the government depends on accessing external funds to finance the post-conflict scenario, while maintaining a relation of dependency with the USA, and it is eager to consolidate its relationships with both North and South partners. In the past years, this has led authorities to acknowledge and publicize the importance of international development assistance in the domestic peace-building process and not to be too critical of traditional aid as an SSC provider, stressing the complementarity between the various types of aid. In those donor-and-recipient countries, there can be tensions between the will to continue being eligible for aid and the will to claim a leadership role and distinguish themselves from traditional aid. These countries usually have to handle duality and adopt distinct postures in a variety of international contexts-namely, in regional spaces with partners of the global South and in multilateral and international spaces with Northern partners-to combine divergent identities interests as donors and recipients.
SSC Providers That Are Not (Anymore) Aid-Recipients
Some of the countries under study are no longer aid-recipients, given ideological options, the existence of an economic income in the country (i.e. oil in the UAE, oil and gas in Venezuela) and/or levels of economic development (i.e. in the UAE and the Republic of Korea). This status of independence towards traditional donors does not determine how these SSC providers relate to and interact with them. For political reasons, the Republic of Korea and the UAE are close to the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors and existing multilateral norms while Cuba and Venezuela are in open opposition to them. Contrary to Venezuela, though, Cuba receives aid from some European countries (e.g. France, Spain, and Switzerland) and from Canada (i.e. a major donor during the 1990s). Now this section turns to how SSC providers perceive and present themselves in the field of aid: Do they identify as "donors" providing "aid" and committed to "SSC"? For authorities, which principles are the most important to describe and refer to the aid/SSC programme, and how do they claim to implement them in practice?
Most SSC providers refuse to consider and present themselves as "donors": Brazil calls itself a "development partner," Colombia says it is a "partner country" (país socio), and Cuba prefers to be known as a provider of "international solidarity." The term "donor" often is eschewed as it carries a (negative) connotation of hierarchy and usually is associated with traditional Western donors that are members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). In this sense, India and South Africa also prefer to use the terms "SSC" and "development partner." China has talked about itself as a donor since the White Papers on Foreign Aid of 2011 and 2014. Nonetheless, Chinese authorities often use other terms, such as "partner," in their discourses towards their Southern counterparts. Venezuela helps their "friends" and "brother countries" (países hermanos). Conversely, the UAE, since 1971, and Turkey have no problem using the word "donor," nor does the Republic of Korea, especially since the country joined the OECD-DAC.
Brasilia and Pretoria claim to set up "development partnerships," not aid. China speaks more frequently of "development assistance" than "aid." In their international statements or in the press, Chinese authorities prefer to speak about "international/technical cooperation," "funds," and "international partnerships." Nevertheless, often it uses the term "aid" when referring to its humanitarian activities. The same is true in India, where aid is usually referred to as "disaster aid" or humanitarian and development assistance, and where the budget officially uses the terms "grants" and "loans" to foreign governments. Bogotá does not speak of "aid" but of SSC, technical cooperation, exchange and transfer of knowledge, and best practices. Cuba refers to "cooperación" and Venezuela to solidarity and friendship. The UAE, Turkey (especially since 2002), and the Republic of Korea call their actions and policy "aid."
Representatives of most of the countries studied in the book claim to be committed to SSC. China's posture, however, is somewhat ambiguous: governments signed several agreements with the United Nations (UN) to promote "South-South Cooperation and Trilateral Cooperation." Chinese representatives also include themselves in the "South" when they speak to aid beneficiaries. Nonetheless, it seems that Chinese authorities also wants to be considered an equal to "Northern" countries and China to be fully included in the category of "developed countries." La Havana speaks of SSC and "international solidarity." The Republic of Korea does not use the term "SSC" at all because its leaders consider it as a Northern country. The UAE officials do not use it either but rather refers to "solidarity" with those culturally close to them ("Arab Solidarity") and "cooperation" with the rest of aid-recipients.
South-South cooperation providers value similar principles, but there are some important nuances in their posture and the practice of it in the field. It is important to note that SSC as a term is not bound to a common or specific framework, which gives the cooperating countries room to "customize" it, interpret it, and employ it according to their interests. In spite of the common principles (e.g. respect of sovereignty), each country can introduce its own specificities into such terms in keeping with its individual interpretations. 3 Brazil puts forward solidarity, horizontality, shared knowledge, nonintervention, mutual benefits, co-responsibility, and the communion of interests. Their SSC policy is demand-driven and devoid of conditionalities.
For China, SSC is based on equality, sovereignty, horizontality, and a win-win condition. Aid comes without conditionalities (except concerning not recognizing Taiwan), and it is based on China's past experience of development; it is tied with Chinese economic interests and largely focuses on technical assistance, the import of equipment and raw materials, infrastructure, industry, natural resource development, and agriculture. Colombia insists on the relevance of shared knowledge and experiencesharing. As for Cuba, Turkey, Brazil, and Colombia, the demand-driven character of SSC is a key priority in their practices, and there are no conditionalities attached to it.
In the case of Colombia, this is put into practice when a partner country makes an official request to the Colombian government (the Agencia Presidencial de Cooperación or the Ministry of External Affairs) to access a specific "best practice." Nevertheless, most of the cooperation responds to political engagements made by the Ministry of External Affairs in regional or bilateral spaces (e.g. the Comisiones Mixtas). Colombian authorities aspire to fully implement the demand-driven principle and in order to do so, the Agencia Presidencial de Cooperación de Colombia organizes workshops, which are based on the assessment or perceptions of the needs of partner countries, where Colombian institutions present its cooperation offer and best practices to their counterparts in partner countries. Subsequently, it is expected that the partner countries will make their specific demands to the agency.
India values solidarity, equality, mutual benefit, and shared knowledge. Turkey's most important considerations are solidarity, shared knowledge, experience-sharing, brotherhood, and global responsibility. Ankara's aid claims to help the society, not the state or governing elite. Turkey does not make direct monetary transfers to beneficiary institutions, and projects are executed directly by Turkish authorities.
Abu Dabhi puts forward solidarity, and Pretoria highlights political solidarity, mutual benefits, respect for sovereignty, the pursuit of common development interests, shared historical burdens, peer and mutual learning, and equality. In the current context of engagement, development cooperation is considered reactive to partners' needs. With the creation of the South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA), the rationale for its leaders is to become proactive, too. Caracas places SSC under the values of solidarity, cooperation, and complementarity. No condition has been established but ideological criteria are crucial when selecting partners.
factorS SuStaining SSc: ideaS, ideologieS, and identitieS
Ideas and ideologies are key resources in imagining and legitimizing the practice of SSC; however, they vary across cases and time. The editors asked the contributors to identify the importance of left-wing or market-based ideas, religion, anti-imperialistic ambitions, the Third World spirit, references to cultural and historical proximity, common political struggles, and so on. Contributors' observations show that while left-wing political ideas are irrelevant to understand today's SSC policies of Turkey, the UAE, India, Colombia, and the Republic of Korea, they have played a key role in Cuba, China, and Venezuela, and to a lesser extent Brazil. It is interesting to note, however, that all the chapters' authors state that ideas and ideologies of anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism, and Third-Worldism, which once sustained SSC, are less salient and are being replaced by foundations such as mutual interest, shared development needs, and common realities; this, they claim, is in line with the contemporary realities that countries face domestically and internationally.
As underscored by Pooja Jain, the Bandung and G77 spirit in the case of India has more or less disappeared and has been replaced by common claims to dignity, distributive justice, and equal representation in international organizations. This is also the case in Cuba, where the ideological foundations under which cooperation was conceived are fading to make room for to a market-oriented approach, translated into the "commodification of humanitarianism." The domestic and policy changes in China have been translated into a shift from ideological emphasis to a more pragmatic approach (Bräutigam 2008) , aligned with the patterns and dynamics of contemporary globalization.
This also is increasingly the case in Brazil under the presidency of Dilma Rousseff, who has made announcements about devising a more pragmatic approach to SSC. South Africa distances itself on this matter, as the debate is not so much structured along a right or left divide but focuses on how to enhance foreign policy (i.e. the geostrategic issues and what the country wants to achieve in a global setting).
The project to establish an anti-imperialistic model of international relations and interactions between Southern countries has played a crucial role for the authorities of Cuba, India, China, and Venezuela, an important one for Brazil, and has been irrelevant elsewhere. The will to contribute to the emergence of a multipolar world is fundamental for the latter countries, except for China; neither is it for Turkey. Venezuela's increase of SSC since the 2000s was framed under the new foreign policy paradigm of the Chavista regime, where the search of a multipolar world gained a central place as an overall foreign policy objective. On the other hand, governments of the UAE, Colombia, the Republic of Korea, and India say that they are inspired by a free-market, "pragmatic" logic.
The discursive positioning of SSC providers often recalls characteristics that present them as closer and equal to their recipients or "partners." Religious and community values matter for Turkey and the UAE's representation and legitimization as aid providers. The case of Turkey illustrates how Ankara deems religion a resource of "soft power" to legitimize and support state-to-state relationships. For the UAE, religion has played a key role in motivating aid, based in Arab solidarity and Islamic charity.
References to culture, history, politics (i.e. common struggles like colonization), and human links (i.e. migrations) are highly significant in most cases. For India, the UAE, Turkey, and Brazil, a common/shared language is seen as facilitating the possibility of cooperation. For India, China, South Africa, and Cuba, the focus is on history, culture, and politics rather than the human dimension; this is so for the Republic of Korea too. These references are marginal only in the case of Colombia, where authorities insist on the importance of shared knowledge about development experiences between countries facing similar challenges more than anything else.
The next two sections deal with the actors in charge of designing and implementing SSC-namely, executive powers and the professionals involved in decisions and policymaking and non-state actors-with an eye towards showing how their leverage and weight differ in each context.
ShaPing SSc: PreSidentialization verSuS ProfeSSionalization
The graph in Fig. 12 .1 reflects the level of personification (i.e. importance of the president in policymaking) and of professionalization of SSC, as the formation of a professional staff of civil servants with a specific expertise and, possibly, shared beliefs and a common identity. This section also looks at the politicization of SSC, in terms of the degree to which it is part of the political debate and party politics. The role of the president is very robust in the cases of Cuba, Turkey, Brazil, Colombia, and Venezuela, and strong in the case of the UAE and the Republic of Korea. For Cuba and Venezuela, this may be because of the centralistic forms of exercising power domestically. Although the commitment to SSC is continuous despite political change in Cuba, in Venezuela its promotion and management was highly personalized and related to the leader, President Hugo Chávez. In the case of Colombia, the influence of the president is decisive in all issues and topics of foreign policy, while the diplomatic corps is weakly institutionalized, and politicized (Tickner 2007) .
As the Indian democracy works along the lines of the British parliamentary system, the power of the presidency is marginal, but the Prime Minister is nodal in SSC policy. Individual leaderships matter; for instance, Jawaharlal Nehru, India's first Prime Minister, played a crucial role in promoting SSC. That said, the Ministry of External Affairs is the top body when it comes to SSC and development assistance policy. The role of the president is weak, but increasing, in China. vis-à-vis the presidency and foreign policy is clear-cut only in Turkey and the Republic of Korea; it is weak everywhere else. In South Africa, the creation of an aid agency with staff that specializes in development assistance is anticipated to increase the autonomy and professionalism of SSC. Politicization, understood as the level of debates and controversies in party politics and public debate, is weak in all cases, except Venezuela and South Africa, where it is "strong" according to the book's contributors. In Venezuela, the opposition started to question sending aid abroad as international oil prices dropped and the country found itself in a severe economic crisis. While the political and economic crisis deepens in Venezuela, the future of its SSC policy will depend on the administration led by the successor of President Hugo Chávez, Nicolás Maduro. Its sustainability is at stake.
In South Africa, politicization is intense and often is seen as strengthening over how the country defines its development cooperation identity in the context of SSC or OECD-DAC alignment. In Brazil, President Lula has been criticized by some members of the opposition for prioritizing the global South and cooperating with Haiti and Africa. Politicians mentioned that some areas in the poorest states of Brazil had statistics similar or worse than those in Haiti and the African countries, and they questioned why Brazil should be mobilizing resources to help those countries while it has domestic problems of its own.
The high presidentialization and weak politicization of SSC does not obstruct its professionalization in most cases; however, this takes different forms for each country and undergoes constant change and adaptation (Pineda, Sidiropoulos, Fues, 2015) . Overall, the contributors deemed that the professionalization of SSC is between weak and strong. Professionalization is very effective in Turkey and in Cuba, and strong and increasing in Brazil, Colombia, and the Republic of Korea.
The case of Brazil is interesting because cooperation is conducted by "cooperantes" that participate actively in expert communities (e.g. health, agriculture). Their character as a professional group, with power in Brazil's bureaucracy, and in the African field cannot be understood by focusing on the development agency, ABC, because it obeys its own logic and rules of functioning, as is described in Chap. 5. The professionalization of staff remains weak but is increasing in the UAE, South Africa, India, and China, but it is weak in Venezuela. South Africa's development assistance programme is politicized but not professionalized, which is recognized as a weakness by the government. Both dimensions are expected to consolidate now that the country is formalizing the creation of an aid agency.
Patterns of presidentialization and professionalization do matter for the institutionalization and sustainability of SSC. If it has revived and become one salient dimension of contemporary international relations, the fact that it remains highly controlled by the executive in many cases, and financed by rises in commodity prices, could affect its continuity because of political changes and a drop in those prices (i.e. Venezuela after Chávez).
other actorS ShaPing SSc: the Private Sector and civil Society
South-South cooperation remains mostly a governmental policy linked to foreign policy, therefore the role of non-state actors in shaping and implementing its policies overall remains weak (with some exceptions), but it is on the rise. The weight of the private sector is insubstantial in Venezuela; weak but increasing in Cuba and Colombia; between weak and strong and increasing in Brazil, depending on the sectors of intervention; strong in the Republic of Korea; strong and increasing for Turkey, the UAE, and China. The case of Cuba is unusual because the role of economic interests in SSC is strong but does not materialize through the private but rather through the public sector-that is, it is the government that sells its medical services to other governments and thus benefits from much-welcome economic income. This helps it handle and mitigate the effects of economic difficulties and international, especially the USA's, boycott measures against the island.
The role of the private sector in South Africa's development cooperation has not always been clear. The government's relationship with the domestic private sector often has been characterized by historical relations of mistrust, especially along racial lines. Although policy frameworks were put in place to address weaknesses in the engagement, such platforms did not always provide a coherent basis for pursuing common interests and often led to a breakdown in dialogues. The legislating of economic empowerment policies to nurture a Black industrial and entrepreneurial class also is aimed at encouraging and strengthening engagements with the state's economic diplomacy efforts and cooperation. In terms of its focus, the South African government is recognizing the need to pursue relationships with the private sector in trilateral development cooperation, especially with regard to infrastructure financing.
In the case of India, the private sector has a very solid influence on the design and implementation of the SSC policy, through the participation in joint platforms, the development of public-private partnerships (PPPs), and as an element of India's soft power (e.g. the case of the ITC sector). In China, several reforms during the 1990s and 2000s further embedded the idea that aid should generate "mutual benefit." For example, in the case of China's engagement in African agriculture, this translated into the linking of aid with business opportunities for Chinese enterprises as a way to increase benefits from aid and to consolidate the achievements of cooperative projects (Bräutigam and Xiaoyang 2009 ).
Colombian officials, especially the Agencia Presidencial para la Cooperación, are willing to report and foster initiatives with the private sector in countries of the global South, and to consider strengthening "coalitions" between the public sector and private foundations and firms as well as to share Colombian "best practices," whether they come from the public or private sector. Colombian authorities refer to "strategic alliances," and these are perceived as a way to reinforce the country's capacity to provide SSC and to "increase the benefit of international cooperation to partner countries" (APC-Colombia 2015) (See Fig. 12.2.) .
Civil society's engagement in SSC is not significant in most cases. It is weak in Cuba, Brazil, India, China, Colombia, and Venezuela; between 12.2 The role of the private sector and civil society weak and strong, and increasing, in the UAE; strong and increasing in the Republic of Korea; and very strong, and increasing, only in Turkey. Turkish Islamic associations indeed have been instrumental in establishing links with communities in Africa for decades.
In South Africa, if civil society organizations (CSOs) are part of global networks (e.g. OXFAM) and are pursuing engagement with the BrazilRussia-India-China-South Africa (BRICS) countries, the G20, climate change, and other social development initiatives on inclusive sustainable development, they have not shared in engagements with the new development agency (i.e. SADPA). The role of civil society and the private sector is expected to increase as the government institutionalizes its development cooperation programme and once the SADPA bill is presented for public comment.
Although the role of civil society is not recognized formally in the institutional apparatus, social movements have been vocal in opposing Brazil's agricultural projects in Mozambique, thus broadening the spectrum of actors involved in SSC and counterbalancing state domination and presidentialization of SSC policy. Independent of official objectives and rhetoric, SSC is not a merely intergovernmental matter: SSC between social actors is underway against specific projects in Mozambique, in connection with other initiatives promoted by the global justice movement.
linkS Between SSc and foreign Policy oBjectiveS
SSC is framed as closely related to the foreign policy objectives of all SSC providers. This should not come as a surprise, nor does it necessarily contradict the ideas and ideologies attached to SSC mentioned previously. This articulation is explored through three lenses here:
(1) Is SSC, for authorities, articulated to a project of regional integration? (2) Is SSC articulated to a project/ambition of regional leadership? (3) Is SSC articulated to a project/ambition of global leadership? South-South cooperation serves a project of regional integration for all the providers covered in this book except for Turkey, China, and the UAE. It is very clear for Latin American donors: Brazil, Cuba, Venezuela, and Colombia-especially at the beginning of Colombia's international cooperation in Latin America and the Caribbean-as well as the current important role in the Alianza del Pacífico. It is interesting to note that these countries do not privilege the same instances of regional integration; because political and ideological differences, initiatives, and organizations have proliferated and competed in Latin America in the past 15 years. For example, Brazil and Colombia are not members of ALBA, an alliance between Cuba and Venezuela that extends selectively in the region; and Cuba is not a member of Brazil's regional project, União de Nações SulAmericanas (UNASUR). The UAE promotes regional solidarity to create stability rather than integration as such.
Beijing clearly conceives of SSC as a means of achieving "regional influence" in and on South East developing countries. This strategy is not limited to neighbouring countries because it reaches into Africa as well. Officials of Brazil and Venezuela too have regional leadership ambitions. The goal of being a regional leader seems to be limited to the Caribbean, and in the security realm to Central America, in the case of Colombia. For representatives of South Africa, SSC is about mutual benefits and partnership more than regional leadership. SSC is not a matter of regional leadership for the leaders of Turkey and the UAE.
The answer to the question "Is SSC articulated to a project/ambition of global leadership?" is "Yes" only for Brazil, China, and Cuba. The ambitions conveyed through SSC are exclusively regional for Caracas-even if President Chávez pursued a foreign policy strategy that took him to faraway places such as Iraq (at the time of Saddam Hussein), Iran, Belarus, Libya, or Vietnam. SSC is used neither at the regional nor international levels by Abu Dhabi. For Pretoria, SSC is perceived as a tool for promoting a reform of the global architecture. In Cuba's case, international cooperation has been a key element in the island's foreign policy since 1959, since the establishment of the Cuban revolutionary regime; and it has served to the rapprochement and legitimization of the country's administration with developing countries all over the world. Two of the contributors (Mehmet Ozkan, Chap. 2, and Jimena Durán, Chap. 9) state that, for Turkey and Colombia, SSC is not about global leadership and highlight a very interesting point: for authorities, it is about international insertion and recognition-that is, the need and desire to be seen and treated as a model, success story, or reliable partner by Western cohorts. This is exactly the contrary for Venezuela under Chávez, where SSC served to counterbalance Western powers; the purpose was to reject the conventional norms, hierarchies, and more implicit rules dictated by the international order and its dominant players. Indeed, Venezuela's SSC has been understood as counterhegemonic and could be interepeted as "voluntarily deviant." Finally, if SSC is closely entrenched in foreign policy imperatives, the articulation between the two elements, its meaning and implications, are differentiated across countries, depending on whether they are BRICS or small states. In the case of the BRICS, the rise of SSC is related to their "emergence." As the case of SSC shows, the latter should be seen as a process, not as a linear or inevitable outcome as tensions arise. As for entrants into regional and/or global leadership, Brazil best exemplifies the tensions at the core of SSC. Indeed, when hegemonic motives and exported models of economic "success" are combined with corporate interests, SSC can generate criticisms and trigger contestation and resistance just like traditional aid does.
It appears that SSC has been a particularly powerful tool for small countries (e.g. the UAE) and revolutionary regimes with few powerful international allies-for example, Cuba after the end of the Cold War and Venezuela during the 2000s. SSC also seems efficient as a symbolic means of cultural-public diplomacy to change a country's international image and status; this is so for the Republic of Korea that has shifted from a poor to a developed country, then to donor and model. In addition, Bogotá is trying to move Colombia's image from problema to security exporter.
In its articulation with foreign policy, apparent ambiguities and contradictions are at the heart of SSC. Donor-and-recipient countries are seeking to reconcile their perceived dependence towards Northern countries with increasing agency and autonomy in international affairs; regional integration and leadership; alliances with other countries of the global South; and, sometimes, greater proximity with partners in the North and with multilateral organizations.
In general, and independent from the level of economic development and diplomatic weight of the countries described, two important trends in SSC can clearly be observed: the rise of security imperatives and economic and/or corporate interests.
The Rise of Security Imperatives
The tendency to incorporate security objectives with, or instead of, development goals in SSC is palpable in India's policy in Mozambique and the Indian Ocean, in Turkey's engagement in Somalia, in the triangular cooperation schemes established between the USA and Colombia in Central America and the Caribbean, and in the patterns in the UAE's humanitarian assistance in the Middle East. This, to a certain extent, leads these countries to converge with Western agendas 5 and/or collaborate with Northern powers (i.e. the USA in Latin America, the USA and the EU in the Middle East and African Horn). In that sense, they do not offer more alternative solutions to the world's security challenges than do the classical antiterrorism packages.
The Rise of Economic and/or Corporate Interests
In the case of the BRICS countries, SSC is clearly a tool to facilitate the internationalization of the rising multinational companies, trade with potential markets, the extraction of resources, and so on. This is obviously the case of India, Brazil, and China. For Cuba, the commodification of SSC policy, specifically medical diplomacy, creates a financing source for the regime. The rise of economic interests at the heart of SSC usually is accompanied by a decline in left-wing ideologies, particularly in China and India, where previous references to socialist planning have faded.
differenceS and interactionS with traditional aid donorS
This final section analyzes SSC's differences and interactions with traditional aid donors. It explores three dimensions of SCC and its providers in particular (Table 12. Out of the nine donors or SSC providers, three are members of the OECD (i.e. Turkey, the Republic of Korea, and the UAE, more recently). Colombia applied for membership in 2011 and its official adhesion process started in 2013. The UAE and the Republic of Korea are also members of the OECD-DAC (Fig. 12.3) .
The second comparative point deals with compliance with the existing norms of aid (i.e. the compliance of SSC providers with traditional aid principles), mostly the Paris Declaration, the MDGs, and the SDGs adopted by the UN. Collaboration is measured by means of the SSC providers' willingness to work with traditional donors through triangular cooperation arrangements.
Compliance with traditional aid is weak for revolutionary regimes (i.e. Cuba, Venezuela) because of their ideological orientations and criticisms against multilateral organs that they deem dominated and manipulated by large, Northern powers. Nonetheless, as stressed by Daniele Benzi (Chap. 3), interestingly both countries tend to stress and overemphasize their domestic MDG accomplishments. Most BRICS (i.e. Brazil, India, China) countries are weakly compliant too, but for other reasons: Typically, they are reluctant to buy into the OECD's framework because the organization is based on selective membership and an exclusive decision-making scheme-that is, it only includes developed countries.
South African elites wonder why emerging donors should conform to the OECD-DAC framework that is still uneven and that they have not been involved in shaping. They opt for unwavering compliance with global multilateral initiatives, which to them reflect a more universal development cooperation agenda and model than does OECD-DAC. They promote a better coordination with the Paris Declaration, though.
Compliance with the existing norms of aid is very strong for Turkey and the UAE-both countries are members of the OECD. Colombia has applied to be a member of the OECD. Here it might be useful, though, to clarify that lately, Bogotá's commitment has been weaker regarding the Paris Declaration but has been very evident vis-à-vis the post-2015 development agenda and the SDGs.
Not surprisingly, the UAE and Colombia are very willing to work with traditional donors and to engage in triangular cooperation schemes. Cuba, Turkey, Brazil, South Africa, and India also are willing to do so, whereas China, Venezuela, and the Republic of Korea are not awfully interested. In the latter case, it is important to underline that officials in Seoul identify as belonging to the group of Northern countries, not to the global South, but are endowed with the knowledge and experience of "Asian" late industrialization. Regarding the last comparative point, Cuba, Turkey, Brazil, China, and Venezuela claim to strongly promote an alternative vision of development. India, South Africa, and the Republic of Korea do so as well. This is because of the promotion of an "Asian model of development" based on official interpretations of South Korea's experience and lessons of economic development. Unsurprisingly, the countries close to the OECD (e.g. the UAE and Colombia) do not claim to promote an alternative model of development in recipient countries; however, Turkey does (Fig. 12.4) .
The claim to "do things different" from, as compared to traditional aid, is shared more broadly by all the Southern donors included in the book. This is very strong in Cuba, Turkey, Brazil, and China; strong in South Africa, India, the UAE, Colombia (the latter two, however, do not claim to promote an alternative vision of development), Venezuela, and the Republic of Korea. According to the chapters' contributors, the claim to difference is growing in all cases, except for South Korea. Since the country is a member of the OECD, though, Seoul has been eager to align more strictly on the OECD-DAC priorities and standards (see Chap. 7); thus, it projects a potentially ambiguous discourse that seeks to reconcile specificity and added-value, which is the "Asian" model of development but complies with dominant norms. This led the country to participate in alliances that had been willing to change the terms of the debate and to put economic In this context, the editors argue that SSC's impacts, results, and evaluations are increasingly important issues. For example, Southern donors claim to do things differently, but they still are deprived of the instruments, indicators, and, often, basic information systems to show how they do so. They contend that their definitions and approach to impacts and results differ and do not buy into existing DAC standards, but often are short of empirical evidence, genuine knowledge, and alternative measurements to sustain their arguments.
Transparency of information is still weak for most SSC providers and donors because updated data concerning the projects, resources, and actors engaging in SSC are scarce. In some instances, this is not the result of a lack of political will but of a lack of capacity to assemble the material, especially to measure and inform the human elements of SSC (e.g. in Brazil or Colombia). In this field, SSC providers could come up with interesting contributions and original views. This is particularly urgent given that, despite their rhetoric anchored in Third Worldism, the nonaligned spirit, anti-imperialism, history and identities, and/or cultural values, the structure of SSC does not always strike as so radically different from traditional aid.
The interest of China and Brazil in natural resources (e.g. mines, oil, and agriculture) in Africa does not challenge the international division of labour and the modalities of the continent's traditional insertion in the world. For that reason, efforts to promote technology transfer (e.g. in the health sector in Mozambique) and knowledge-sharing (e.g. in the Republic of Korea and Colombia) hold more promise for innovation and horizontality in the practice of development assistance.
Last, but not least, it is important to emphasize that the lack of Southern donors' autonomy vis-à-vis traditional aid cannot be captured only by their willingness to work with traditional by donors. Their engagement in triangular cooperation schemes. Like the focus on the human nature of SSC, technical assistance, or knowledge transfer is nurtured not only by a special vision of development assistance but also is justified by the scarcity of funds allocated to SSC; this is so even in emerging countries, where economic leverage and the political basis for sending aid abroad are miniscule.
The "human dimension" is, of course, an interesting and distinct feature of SSC that could create close and sustainable relations of proximity and horizontality between participants. Nevertheless, it also can impede the possibility to "scale up" in the field of development assistance and to provide incentives to establish collaborations with traditional donors at the expense of autonomy. Southern donors are tempted to benefit from the links and infrastructures of traditional donors in countries of the global South located outside of their region or customary zone of influence.
As already mentioned, Southern donors have yet to show their ability to produce alternative knowledge and evaluation systems about development and cooperation. There is even some mimicry about the "best practices" exported through SSC by Colombia (Tickner 2016; Bergamaschi et al. Chap. 9) and Brazil; civil servants of these two countries "teach" today what they have been taught as aid-recipients by traditional donors in the past-respectively, the USA in the field of security and Japan in the sector of agriculture. (For more on this, see the description of and filiations between the projects, Prodecer in Brazil and the ProSavana in Mozambique, in Chap. 10).
For financial reasons among others, Colombia coalesced with the World Bank in order to systematize SSC information and knowledge in the process related to the Global Partnership for Effective Development Assistance driven by the DAC and then jointly with the UN Development Programme (UNDP). The World Bank likes to call itself "the Bank of Knowledge" and would not abandon its de facto quasimonopoly on the production of knowledge about development and poverty internationally. The UNDP supports cooperation agencies in emergent and middleincome countries: ABC in Brazil (Cabral and Weinstock 2010) and the Agencia Presidencial para la Cooperación in Colombia, through a project "institutional strengthening of APC-Colombia."
As shown by Erthal and da Fonseca (2013), 7 the porosity of Southern donors to traditional donors' initiatives to co-opt them, or to keep the upper hand on SSC, are also visible in knowledge and training. Many young Latin American professionals have been trained in Spain thanks to grants and courses provided by the Agencia Española para la Cooperación Internacionla y el Desarrollo (AECID), the Fundación Carolina, and Galicia, among others. There they learn about development, governance, triangular cooperation, and the possibility of building "bridges" between the North and the South. The penetration of traditional donors into SSC schemes happens not only in like-minded countries (e.g. Colombia, Mexico, Argentina, Chile, and Peru) but also in countries governed by so-called "revolutionary" administrations such as Ecuador and to a lesser extent Bolivia. 8 The government of Germany offers a course called "Triangular Cooperation with Latin America and the Caribbean: International Competence Building" to international cooperations' professionals in partner countries that are linked to its Triangular Cooperation Fund for the region. The Republic of Korea's authorities tend to be positive about their country's experience as an aid-recipient, and run a training programme entitled "Korea's Development Cooperation Policy." It focuses on their general approach to development and international cooperation; it is aimed at civil servants from Asia, Africa, and Latin America in the field of international cooperation.
As a result of what has been described here, it is not clear whether Southern countries are willing to make the financial sacrifices, and the political choice, to build domestic support for sending aid abroad, investing in research and development to prove their added-value, and in fine to maintain their autonomy towards traditional aid and donors. 
